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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of mortality in the districts/states represented in key con-
gressional groups (i.e. committees, subcommittees, and parties) on the public investment in medical
research in the US. I focus on National Institutes of Health (NIH) R01 grants awarded between
1985-2002. Exploiting the recomposition of any group after congressional elections, I estimate that
the composition of the House Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education
and Related Agencies (HouS), impacts the NIH budget: a 1% increase of life-years lost because
of a disease in the districts represented in HouS increases the funds for clinical research on that
disease by 1.2-3.2%. I also find that this impact results from the larger bargaining power of HouS
or the House majority, or both groups, in the budget process. No group significantly impacts the
allocation of funds for basic research, or the allocation of funds across states.
Keywords: Health Policy, Government Policy, Publicly-Provided Goods, Medical Research.
JEL Classification Number: H4, I1
1 Introduction
This paper studies the effect of the composition of major groups in Congress — i.e. committees,
subcommittees, and parties — on the public budget for medical research in the US. The social cost of a
disease, such as its impact on life-years lost or its mortality rate, varies across districts and across states,
∗I am extremely grateful to Jay Bhattacharya for his generous support and advice on this project. I would also
like to thank Romain Aeberhardt, Luc Behaghel, Tim Bresnahan, Caroline Hoxby, Matt Jackson, Seema Jayachandran,
Ryan Lampe, Aprajit Mahajan, Neale Mahoney and Eduardo Perez for helpful comments. I also thank Dana Goldman,
Margaret Blume Kohout, Daniella Meeker who helped me to retrieve part of the NIH data and to become more acquainted
with the NIH grants.
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and hence across congressional groups. In any given group, the social cost of a disease may also change
over time, due to the possible recomposition of the group following congressional elections, which occur
every two years. I exploit these changes to estimate the effect of the change of life-years lost due to
a disease on the change of federal funds for research on that disease distributed through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) R01 grants. For this purpose, I construct a data set gathering information
on NIH-funded projects for the period 1985-2002, combined with data on mortality across districts and
states, and with data on the composition of relevant congressional groups. I find that the composition
of one group, the House Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies of the Appropriations Committee (HouS), has a distinct influence on the allocation of public
funds for clinical research across diseases, where, by definition, clinical research, as opposed to basic
research, encompasses any research project that involves human subjects, such as clinical trials. An
increase of 1 percent of life-years lost because of a disease in the districts represented in HouS increases
the funds for clinical research on that disease by 1.2-3.2 percent. On average, this effect corresponds
to an increase of yearly funds for clinical research equal to around $3600 for every additional life-year
lost in the population of the districts represented in HouS.1
The hypothesis that profit incentives impact private investment in R&D, and, ultimately, the
nature of scientific discoveries, has opened a vast area of research (e.g. Drandakis and Phelps 1966,
Samuelson 1965, Hayami and Ruttan 1970, Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and
Howitt 1992 and Acemoglu 2002), and several empirical studies aim to distinguish this impact from
that of the factors that may improve the relative productivity of R&D in some given field (see Section
2). Public funding of R&D has been much less studied than private investment, however, even though
abundant normative work supports the value of that funding (e.g. Arrow 1962, Griliches, Klette and
Møen 2000, and Murphy and Topel 2006).2 Further, the amounts of private and public investments
in medical R&D have been comparable for the last decades — for instance, the NIH budget and
the private investment in pharmaceutical research amounted respectively to around 30 and 40 billion
dollars in 2006 — and could thus have comparable consequences on medical innovations.3 NIH R01
grants, which are the most common and best-documented grants, represent more than half of the NIH
1Unless mentioned otherwise, all the monetary amounts in this paper are in dollars of 2000.
2As stated by Griliches, Klette and Møen 2000: “There is [...] little controversy among economists about the desir-
ability of governmental support to these activities.”
3See “AAAS Guide to R&D Funding Data,” available on http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guide.shtml.
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budget and constitute a primary source of information on the distribution of federal funds for medical
research, since they usually fund circumscribed projects that can be matched to a single disease or to
a small set of diseases.4 Focusing on these grants, the main contribution of this study is to raise a
determinant of investment in medical R&D that does not stem from either profit incentives or from the
relative productivity of medical R&D across diseases, under the assumption that these other factors are
not correlated with changes in mortality within congressional groups caused by electoral outcomes.
How do the results of the effect of the composition of HouS on clinical research inform the
functioning of Congress? If the parameters that define the utility a congressman derives from medical
research are uncorrelated with his or her membership status in HouS — in short, if HouS members are
not preference outliers — these results show that HouS members have an effective larger bargaining
power on the NIH appropriations than the rest of the House, and than the other groups I consider.
Since that assumption could be questioned, I perform an instrumental variable analysis and other tests
to estimate the actual power of HouS members on the allocation of NIH funds. Due to the correlation
between mortality conditions in HouS districts and the districts represented in the House majority,
these estimations do not permit distinguishing the respective bargaining power of the representatives
of these two groups. However, these estimations and additional estimations of the influence of the
House majority party do indicate that the members of one or both of these groups have an advantage
in the bargaining process that decides on the allocation of funds across diseases, and use this power
to favor clinical research on diseases that affect more their constituents. No other group has any
significant power on that allocation.
Congressmen could use their bargaining power to meet local objectives other than supporting
research on their constituents’ diseases: they may want to supply funds to the research institutes
located in their jurisdictions. I investigate that point and find no robust impact of the number of
representatives of a state represented in HouS, or in any other group, on the sum of funds received
by the research institutions located in that state. Earmarking of federal funds for research to specific
locations, although raised in numerous anecdotes and empirical studies (see Cohen and Noll 1991 and
4This budget, dedicated to medical research, consumes around half of the public budget for non-defense research,
much more than the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NIH is the main agency in charge of distributing federal
funds to research projects on biomedical topics. Other agencies may also award research grants on similar topics, such
as the NSF and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The HHS supports mainly health services and
training, and the NSF may support any area of scientific research, with a budget almost equal to a fifth of the NIH
budget on average for the period studied here.
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Section 2), has no substantial effect on the allocation of funds across states for the specific type of
NIH grants I consider.
Since congressmen, with the President, have full institutional authority on the allocation of NIH
funds, why don’t they use their bargaining power to influence the allocation of funds across states, or
the allocation of funds for basic research across diseases? To address these questions, I present some
evidence suggesting that congressmen are concerned with the productivity of medical research, but
lack information on it. With a simple model and anecdotal facts on the organization of the NIH, I
argue that their concern for research productivity can lead congressmen to delegate their authority
on the allocation of funds to the NIH staff for some share of the funds if the NIH has substantially
more information on the respective productivity of the projects supported by that share of funds.
Conversely, the legal restrictions imposed on any clinical research project, due to the involvement
of human subjects, increase Congress’ information about this type of research, and hence decrease
Congress’ incentive to delegate the allocation decision to the NIH. In Aghion and Tirole 1997’s words,
Congress has formal authority on the allocation of federal funds for basic research, and real authority
on the allocation of federal funds for clinical research.
2 Related Literature
This study contributes to two strands of research: the empirical literature on the determinants
of medical innovations and the literature on congressional bargaining. Several studies belonging to
the former literature examine the impact of various sources of funding on the production of medical
research (see e.g. Blume-Kohout, Kumar and Sood 2009, Jacob and Lefgren 2007 specifically for
the NIH, and the whole field of scientometrics). Productivity of research varies substantially across
sources of funding, which suggests to investigate the motivations of the institutions that invest in
R&D. Following the profit incentives hypothesis, Azoulay and Tay 2003, Cerda 2003, Acemoglu and
Linn 2004, Lichtenberg and Waldfogel 2003 and Finkelstein 2004, for instance, show that changes in
the (potential) demand for a cure, or for a related good, induce changes in the nature or the volume of
pharmaceutical innovations. Among them, Azoulay and Tay 2003, Lichtenberg and Waldfogel 2003 and
Finkelstein 2004 use public health decisions or recommendations, regarding drugs for orphan diseases
and vaccines, as exogenous shocks on the demand of medical goods to control for the productivity
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of medical research. Such studies motivate the investigation of the factors driving public decisions
themselves, which result from some bargaining among legislators who represent specific constituencies.
Few papers study the factors that impact the amount of public funds devoted to research on some
given topic. Lichtenberg 1999 finds a correlation between NIH funds and mortality, but does not
control for scientific productivity. Bhattacharya and Packalen 2008 and Cutler, Meara and Richards
2009 link the level of investment in research to mortality in the US, the former using the same
instruments as Acemoglu and Linn 2004. Here, I find that mortality in certain districts has a larger
impact, and estimate this impact, controlling for research productivity. Like Ellison and Wolfram
2001 and Miller 2008, this paper stresses the role of political economy on medical issues. Under the
assumption that congressmen affiliated to the groups studied here do not have distinct preferences for
medical research, this paper also shows that the link between mortality and public funding of medical
research results from a combination of congressional power and local concerns. In addition, this paper
contributes to the open question of empirical effects of the composition of majorities in Congress (see
e.g. Jayachandran 2006 and Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006) and provides evidence that the
House majority party has a substantial influence on the allocation of federal funds for research.
The local concerns studied here also differ from the local pork-barrel objectives usually raised in
the political economy literature on congressional bargaining. Several studies (e.g. Cohen and Noll
1991, Ferejohn 1974, Atlas et al. 1995 and Knight 2005) show how the geographic origin of members
of relevant committees affects the geographic allocation of federal funds. This influence has proven
useful in explaining other differences across states (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005 or Levitt and Snyder
1997). For the NIH, Payne 1999, Payne 2003 and Hegde 2009 find some impact of congressional power
on the geographic allocation of NIH funds. Indeed, Hegde 2009 finds that research centers located
in the states represented in HouS do receive more research funds, but mitigates the impact of such
earmarking by showing that this effect is limited to centers with relatively little expertise. The bulk
of NIH funds traditionally goes to the same small set of universities, which do have expertise in any
field, so that, on aggregate, earmarking to local research institutes should have limited consequences.
Here, I find that the effect of local pork-barrel is indeed not significant at the state level.
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3 The NIH Budget System
Institutionally, Congress and the President decide on the NIH budget every year. The Appro-
priations committees of both chambers are in charge of designing a budget proposal that will then
be submitted to the whole Congress — the House of Representatives first, the Senate second.5 The
Appropriations bill for the NIH specifies the budget to be received by every institute (or center or
agency) composing the NIH. After the budget is passed, these institutes, in turn composed of experts
on medical research, are responsible for distributing this money through research grants to support
research projects on topics related to their area of interest. The partition of the NIH itself results from
congressional approval; a bill can create or terminate an institute or a center. For instance, Congress
refused to create an entity specialized in the funding of research on HIV, proposed by President Clin-
ton.6 In other words, there is no institutional limitation on congressmen and the president’s formal
power over the distribution of public funds across research topics. In practice, congressmen thus have
direct control over the research agenda of the NIH through two channels: deciding on the organization
of the NIH and specifying the budget of every institute.
Some institutes are specifically responsible for supporting research on a single disease or set of
diseases (such as the National Cancer Institute, or the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Dis-
eases), whereas others may award grants for basic research on any topic (such as the National Institute
of General Medical Sciences) or support projects studying specific technology (such as the National
Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering). As a result, in several instances, the foci of the
institutes and centers overlap, whereas some topics are strictly included in the foci of a single institute.
In addition to controlling the Appropriations bill, congressmen may detail their preferences regarding
the use of NIH funds. These views are recorded in the congressional reports. An examination of the
reports suggests that both research productivity and distributive concerns determine the allocation of
the NIH budget. The congressional report of the 104th Congress relative to the Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill contains the
following statement:7
5Like the rest of the budget, it is enacted unless it is vetoed by the President.
6However, Congress approved the creation of the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (Source:
AAAS R&D Funding Update December 18, 2000).
7104th Congress, 2nd Session House of Representatives, 104-659, Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriation Report, 1997.
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“The [Appropriations] Committee believes that NIH should distribute funding on the basis of sci-
entific opportunity.[...] To enhance NIH’s flexibility to allocate funding based on scientific opportunity,
the Committee has attempted to minimize the amount of direction provided in the report accompa-
nying the bill. [...] In stating that scientific opportunity should be the basis for allocating research
funding, the Committee understands that other factors are also relevant to NIH’s decisions, including
such considerations as the infectious nature of a disease, the number of cases and deaths associated
with a particular disease, the Federal and other costs of treating a disease, the years of productive life
lost due to a particular disease, and the estimated proximity to research breakthroughs. The Commit-
tee does not presume to judge which criteria should take precedence in individual funding decisions,
but urges NIH to consider the full array of relevant criteria as it constructs its research portfolio.”
In addition, the bills often specify how the funds might be allocated across topics within the
institutes or centers. As in the previous excerpt, the bills often repeat that the NIH has authority
on the allocation of funds, yet give precise suggestions for the use of those funds. For instance, the
previous report mentions:
“AIDS Funding. — Consistent with the philosophy outlined above, the Committee has again
chosen not to earmark a specific dollar amount for AIDS research and has not provided a single ap-
propriation for the Office of AIDS Research. In relying on NIH’s recommendations for the allocation
of the total funding provided by the Committee, the Committee understands that it would be NIH’s
intent to allocate AIDS funding in the following manner:[...]” [The report then details the amount of
funds for research on HIV to be awarded by every institute or center.]
The Appropriations committees of either chamber (HouA and SenA), cited here, are not the only
groups that may influence the appropriations of funds across research areas: within the Appropria-
tions committees, the Subcommittees on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies of the Appropriations Committee (HouS and SenS) have the specific task of drafting the NIH
budget proposal; in the Senate, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (SenL) is
in charge of providing recommendations for the NIH budget. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the list of
groups I consider in this study, and present some information on their role and their size for every
term of the period.
7
4 Description of the Data
I construct two sets of data for this study: data on mortality by districts or states represented
in the congressional groups reported in table 1, and data on the NIH R01 grants. Both sets of data
span the period 1985-2002, i.e. nine terms. Table 14, in the Appendix, reports summary statistics of
all the variables used in this work.
4.1 Data on mortality and congressional groups
The first set of data merges three types of information on congressmen’s affiliations from the
congressional directories for the period 1985-2002, data from the death certificates that are recorded
every year in the Vital Statistics data files, and data on the composition of congressional districts,
provided by Adler 2008.8 For every death, the Vital Statistics data files report the age, the main
cause of death, the state of residence of the deceased, and whether the deceased was Black or not. I
use these data to compute the number of life-years lost to 100 years old, life − yearssd, in the state
represented by the senator s, because of the disease d in a given year:9
life− yearssd ≡
∑
i, resident of
the state of s
(100−Age of deathi)1{i died of d} (1)
Since the Vital Statistics files do not specify the district of the deceased, I use information on
the race of congressional districts residents from Adler 2008 to estimate the number of life years lost
life− yearsrd (plus 100) in the district represented by the representative r, because of the disease d:
life− yearsrd ≡ pibl(r, s)
∑
i, resident of
the state of r
(100−Age of deathi)1{i died of d} × 1{i Black} (2)
+pinbl(r, s)
∑
i, resident of
the state of r
(100−Age of deathi)1{i died of d} × 1{i non−Black}
where pibl(r, s) (resp. pinbl(r, s)) is the share of Black (resp. non-Black) residents of the state of senator
8These latter data are available on http://sobek.colorado.edu/∼esadler/Congressional District Data.html.
9Using the difference between the age at death and some other high age, e.g. 120 years old, gives very similar results
in the following estimations.
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s living in the district represented by the representative r.10
With the previous notations, I define LY gd,t, the share of life-year lost due to a disease d in all the
districts (resp. states) represented in the group g of the House (resp. Senate) in Congress term t, as:11
LY gd,t ≡
∑
c∈g at t life− yearscd∑
d∈D
∑
c∈g at t life− yearscd
(3)
where D is the set of diseases. In some specifications, I also use the average number of life-years lost
in the districts of the group g:
`ygd,t ≡
∑
c∈g at t life− yearscd
#{c ∈ g at t} (4)
I use the Vital Statistics file for the year 1991 to estimate life-years lost variables for all the groups of
Table 1 and all the Congress terms. The relative impact of a disease on a state is extremely stable over
the period, so that using mortality data of 1984 or 1998 gives the same results in the estimations.12
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the share of life-years lost by disease for the US as a whole in
1991, and for the House majority (HouM). The set of twelve diseases (or disease categories) retained
in this study causes more than 90 per cent of the deaths in the US in 1991. All the other deaths
are due to accidents, murders, or unidentifiable causes. The table shows the correlation between the
distribution of life-years lost across diseases in the US and in HouM or HouS. The standard deviation
of life-years lost in HouM and HouS reflect changes in the composition of these groups every Congress
term. Figure 1 illustrates the change of mortality on the House majority following the 1995 majority
shift.
4.2 Data on NIH grants
The second set of data derives from detailed information on R01 grants at the grant level provided
in various NIH databases: the REsearch Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (REPORT) for the period
1992-2009, the NIH data supplied by the NBER (Lichtenberg 1999) for the period 1986-1991 and the
10Since Adler 2008’s data do not contain information on the last years of the period, I assume that the composition of
the districts did not changed between 1998 and 2002 to compute life-years lost in districts after 1998.
11I count twice the life years lost of a state whose two senators are in the group.
12These estimations are available upon request.
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Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects (CRISP) database.13 I use these data to
gather the following information for every competing R01 grant: the fiscal year the grant was awarded
(which is by definition one year after the budget is voted on), the total amount of funds received by
the grantee for the whole length of the grant, the state where the research institution of the grantee is
located, the specific agency within the NIH awarding the grant and a set of keywords describing the
research project funded by the grant.
The keywords describing a grant mention whether the research hereby funded involved human
subjects. I define such research as clinical, and the other projects as basic.
When possible, I also match every grant to a unique disease in the set of disease or disease
categories retained here (see Table 3). The matching is not possible for some grants that support
research on sets of conditions that are too large to be matched with a unique disease (e.g. pathology),
or that are related to non-lethal conditions (e.g. back injury).14 Finally, due to missing information,
some grants cannot be matched to a US state. Table 13, in Appendix, reports the sum of funds
awarded through R01 grants by Congress term (column “Total funds”). After removing all the missing
observations and the grants that cannot be matched to a single disease, I obtain a sample that amounts
to more than 80 per cent of the actual budget for R01 grants on average (column “Sample funds”).
For the purpose of this paper, I aggregated these data so as to obtain the total amount of funds
awarded by disease, by type of research and by Congress term (and by state, for some specifications).
Table 3 reports some summary statistics by disease and type of research. They show the positive
correlation between the funds for research on a disease, either basic or clinical, and the share of
life-years lost, in the US or in the House majority.
13Except for the NBER data, all the other data are now available on http://report.nih.gov/. The NIH documentation,
available on http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/r01.htm, mentions: “The Research Project Grant (R01) is the original
and historically oldest grant mechanism used by NIH. The R01 provides support for health-related research and devel-
opment based on the mission of the NIH. [...] The Research Project (R01) grant is an award made to support a discrete,
specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing the investigator’s
specific interest and competencies, based on the mission of the NIH.”
14The matching strategy, partly based on Toole 2007, and the other details of the construction of these data are
described in a thorough technical appendix available upon request.
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5 Model and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Congress’ Allocation Problem
This section presents a simple static model that aims to formalize the description of the NIH
budget process, and provides a basis for the discussion in Section 7.15 Let K denote the set of
“research categories” partitioning the NIH budget. For instance, K could be the set of diseases, the
set of research institutes, the combination of both, or any other set relevant for the classification of
research projects. There are two agents: Congress C and the NIH staff N . For any research category
k ∈ K, Congress C may choose a level of public investment Fk ∈ R+. Investing Fk in research k yields
a scientific return equal to ckF
γ
k , — for example the “production of knowledge on topic k” — where
γ ∈ (0, 1) and the productivity factor ck is independently drawn from a random variable with density
gk(ck), with a support in R+.
For investments (Fk)k∈K , the ex-post utility derived by i = C or N is:
U i
(
(Fk)k∈K
)
≡
∑
k∈K
ckF
γ
kA
i
k − λi
∑
k∈K
Fk (5)
where ∀k ∈ K,Aik > 0, λC > 0, λN = 0. I assume that, ex-ante, Congress C does not know ck, whereas
N does, but that C has the possibility to delegate the allocation of a chosen amount of funds into the
categories of a chosen subset M of K to the NIH N , and decides of the amount of funds for the other
categories L ≡ K \M . Congress C’s problem is then:

Max{F∈R+,L⊂K,FL∈R+ #L}E
[∑
k∈L ckF
γ
kA
C
k +
∑
k∈M ckFˆ
γ
kA
C
k
∣∣∣∣g]− λCF
s.t.
 FˆM ≡ Argmax{FM∈R+#M}
∑
k∈M ckF
γ
kA
N
k∑
k∈M Fk = F −
∑
k∈L Fk∑
k∈L Fk +
∑
k∈M Fˆk = F
L ∪M = K,L ∩M = Ø
(6)
where: FL ≡ (Fk)k∈L for any L ⊂ K and g ≡ (gk)k∈K . A solution to that problem always exists,
since a solution of the sub-problem defined by adding the constraint L = L0 to the problem 6 has
15Although it also substantiates some specifications, it is not necessary for the understanding of most of the empirical
sections 4, 5.2 and 6.
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a solution for any L0 ⊆ K, and there is a finite number of such subsets. The solution need not be
unique, however. Let
(
F ∗, L∗,F∗L∗
) ∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L∗ denote a solution of the previous program.
Proposition 1. Let K ≡ {1, ...., n} the set of research categories, gk(c), the probability density function
of the productivity factor ck, and assume that g2 second-order dominates g1 and A
i
1 = A
i
2, for i = C,N .
If 1 ∈ L∗ for some solution (F ∗, L∗,F∗L∗) ∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L∗ of the Congress’ problem, then there
also exists a solution
(
F˜ ∗, L˜∗,F∗
L˜∗
) ∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L˜∗ of this problem such that 2 ∈ L˜∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition means that C is more likely to delegate the allocation of funds across research
categories about which it has less precise information.
Specification of the functional forms — For the largest level of aggregation in the es-
timations, the set K is D × Θ, where D is the set of diseases and Θ ≡ {basic, clinical} the set of
types of research. The main variable of interest at this level of aggregation is the log of the share of
life-years lost due to disease d in the group g, denoted logLY gd . Given the set of potentially powerful
groups G in Congress, I posit the following reduced form for ACk (expressed in logs for clarity):
logACd,θ =
∑
g∈G
wg × (pig + pigClinic × Clinicθ) logLY gd (7)
where wg is the institutional bargaining power of group g, pig and pigClinic are two parameters that allow
the utility derived from medical research to vary across types of research, and Clinicθ is a variable
equal to 1 if θ = clinical and 0 otherwise.16 Since part of the allocation decision may be delegated to
the NIH staff, the first-order conditions of C and N ’s problems imply that the amount of funds Fd,θ,
awarded for research of type θ on disease d, can be written:
logFd,θ =
∑
g∈G
δd,θ × wg × (pig + pigClinic × Clinicθ)
1− γ × logLY
g
d + (8)
1− δd,θ,s
1− γ logA
N
d,θ +
log γ − δd,θ log λC
1− γ +
δd,θ log E[cd,θ] + (1− δd,θ)cd,θ
1− γ
16Note that congressmen need not be partitioned into groups, but may belong to several of them.
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where δd,θ is equal to 1 if the amount of funds allocated to the “research category” (d, θ) is decided
by Congress, i.e. (d, θ) ∈ L∗ with the previous notations, and 0 if it is decided by the NIH. Consider
the products of parameters of the first term of the right-hand-side in the equation 8, renamed βg and
βgClinic:
βg ≡ 1
1− γ × δd,basic × w
g × pig (9)
βgClinic ≡
1
1− γ × δd,clinical × w
g × pigClinic
For the finest level of aggregation in the estimations, the set K is D×Θ×S, where S is the set of
American states. The variables of interest at this level of aggregation are the number of congressmen
of the state s in the group g, denoted NCgs , and logLY
g
d . With similar notations as before, the amount
of funds Fd,θ for research of type θ on disease d awarded to research institutes located in the state s
can be written:
logFd,θ,s =
∑
g∈G
δd,θ,s × wg × (pig1 + pigClinic,1 × Clinicθ)
1− γ × logLY
g
d + (10)
∑
g∈G
δd,θ,s × wg × (pig2 + pigClinic,2 × Clinicθ)
1− γ ×NC
g
s +
1− δd,θ,s
1− γ logA
N
d,θ,s +
log γ − δd,θ,s log λC
1− γ +
δd,θ,s log E[cd,θ,s] + (1− δd,θ,s)cd,θ,s
1− γ
I rename the products of interest in this equation βg, βgClinic, ρ
g and ρgClinic as follows:
βg ≡ 1
1− γ × δd,basic × w
g × pig1 (11)
βgClinic ≡
1
1− γ × δd,clinical × w
g × pigClinic,1
ρg ≡ 1
1− γ × δs,basic × w
g × pig2
ρgClinic ≡
1
1− γ × δs,clinical × w
g × pigClinic,2
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In the estimations, I assume that the parameter wg reflects the institutional rules that govern con-
gressional decisions, which have not changed over the period studied. Equations 8 and 10 show that
I can infer the bargaining power wg of any group g, up to a constant normalization factor, from the
estimation of βg, βgClinic, ρ
g
Clinic or ρ
g
Clinic, under the assumption that the parameter pi
g is constant
across groups, i.e. no group has a distinct interest for medical research. I discuss more this point in
Section 5.2.
5.2 Empirical strategy and specification
Consider a group g of interest, LYd,t the share of life-years lost due to disease d in the districts
represented in the group g at t, formally defined in equation 3, and NCs,t the number of congressmen
of state s in g at t (the superscript .g on these variables, present in the model of Section 5.1, is omitted
here for readability.) The main purpose of the empirical part is to estimate the effect of these two
variables on the allocation of public funds for medical research (i.e. the parameters β and βClinic
and/or ρ and ρClinic in equations 9 and 11 in the Section 5.1).
To do so, at the largest level of aggregation, I estimate a linear model of the form:
logFd,θ,t = cd,θ + β logLYd,t + βClinic logLYd,t × Clinicθ + µXd,θ,t + d,θ,t (12)
And, at the finest level of aggregation, I estimate a linear model of the form:
logFd,θ,s,t = cd,θ,s+β logLYd,t+βClinic logLYd,t×Clinicθ+ρNCs,t+ρClinicNCs,t×Clinicθ+µXd,θ,s,t+d,θ,s,t
(13)
where Fd,θ,t (resp. Fd,θ,s,t) is the amount of funds for research on disease d of type θ awarded in
Congress term t (resp. on disease d of type θ, awarded to research institutes in state s in Congress
term t), and Clinicθ is a dummy variable equal to one if θ = clinical, and 0 θ = basic. The vector
of variables Xd,θ,t (resp. Xd,θ,s,t) may include control variables such as LY or NC variables for other
groups, as well as Congress term dummy variables, and their interactions with Clinicθ. The term cd,θ
(resp. cd,θ,s) is the unobserved fixed effect for research on disease d of type θ (resp. on disease d of
type θ performed in state s). These terms correspond to all the terms on the lowest lines of equations
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8 and 10. Standard errors are clustered at the disease and type of research level (resp. at the disease
and type of research and state level).
For the estimated coefficients of interest βˆ, βˆClinic, ρˆ or ρˆClinic to represent the group g’s bar-
gaining power as in equations 9 and 11 of Section 5.1, the two following necessary assumptions must
be satisfied: (1) the productivity of research on a disease is not correlated with the relative impact
that disease has on the constituents represented in the group g, and (2) the utility congressmen derive
from medical research is uncorrelated with their affiliation to that group.
The exogenous timing of congressional elections supports the identification assumption (1): every
two years, the composition of the majority (or of any committee or subcommittee) may change, follow-
ing elections outcomes. The affiliation of a congressman to the majority party is a direct consequence
of the elections, and the assignment of a congressman to a committee or subcommittee is decided
within her/his party at the beginning of every term. A congressman’s assignment will depend on
her/his preferences and clout at the time of the process, as well as on congressional rules governing the
assignment process (Schneider 2007). The life-years lost function of a group induced by the elections
is thus likely uncorrelated with the distribution of shocks on research productivity across diseases.
The identification assumption (2) requires that congressmen do not enter the group only because
they have a distinct interest in medical research, or because they felt wronged in the previous NIH
budget decisions. Assumption (2) should hold for members of any party, or of any Appropriations
committee, since they can be involved in any decision regarding the use of federal funds, not only the
budget for medical research. This assumption is more problematic for the subcommittees HouS and
SenS and for the committee SenL, however, even though these subcommittees and this committee are
also in charge of several issues such as education or labor conditions.
To account for the possible failure of assumption (2), I conjecture that, within the Appropriations
committees, congressmen with more political influence are assigned to the subcommittees with a higher
average share of budget by member. Two facts support this conjecture: the size of the subcommittees
is constrained by congressional and party rules (Schneider 2007) that are stable throughout years,
and the total size of the budget that falls upon the responsibility of any subcommittee seems roughly
exogenous (see for instance Dalton 2000’s report of the doubling of the NIH budget starting in 1996).
I use the number of consecutive terms a congressman c has served in the same chamber (tenuCc,t)
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and in the Appropriations committee (tenuAc,t), counting backwards from t, as proxies for political
influence. For any congressman c ∈ C active at t, and any subcommittee g, I estimate the probability
for congressman c to be affiliated with the group g, given that she or he has served tenuCc,t successive
terms in the chamber, and tenuAc,t successive terms in its Appropriations committee:
P (c ∈ g, t|tenuAc,t, tenuCc,t) = Φ(ω0 1
tenuCc,t
+ ω1tenuAc,t + µXt) (14)
where Xt is a vector of Congress term dummies. Denoting the predicted probabilities
Pˆ (c ∈ g, t|tenuAc,t, tenuCc,t),
the instrument for the first difference of the log of LY gd,t is the first difference of the log of:
LY g∗d,t =≡
∑
c∈g at t Pˆ (c ∈ g, t|tenuAc,t, tenuCc,t)× life− yearscd∑
d∈D
∑
c∈g at t Pˆ (c ∈ g, t|tenuAc,t, tenuCc,t)× life− yearscd
(15)
The same procedure can also be used to construct instruments for the number of congressmen of a
state in HouS or SenS, or instruments for life-years lost in the states represented in SenS or SenL.
6 Results
6.1 Allocation of funds across diseases
This section focuses on the impact of life-years lost across diseases and groups on the allocation
of funds across diseases, i.e. on the estimation of the coefficients β and βClinic of equations 12 and 13
for the set of groups of table 1.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimation of the coefficients of the first difference of equation 12, sep-
arately for every group, twice.17 The first series of estimations (columns 1 to 7) shows that life-years
lost in HouS impact NIH funds for clinical research, positively and significantly. No other group,
except HouM (significant at 10%), has a significant positive impact on the budget. The second series
of estimations (columns 8 to 13), indicate that the effect of HouS holds when controlling for other
groups. In all the estimations, life-years lost in HouS have a negative impact on basic research. This
17The small size of the sample and the correlation between life-years lost variables would limit the interpretation of a
regression including all life-years lost variables at once.
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effect is significant at 10%, for some specifications. The estimated negative effect of life-years lost in
HouS on NIH funds may reflect HouS’ smaller bargaining power on the allocation of basic funds. It
may also result from the negative correlation of life-years lost in HouS with some omitted variables.
The previous tables show that the significance of that term disappears when life-years lost variables
for other groups are included as well, which support that latter hypothesis. Overall, no group has any
robust impact on the allocation of funds for basic research.
Depending on whether we take into account the estimated coefficient βˆ, a 1 percent increase in
life-years lost in districts represented in HouS leads to a 1.3-2.7 percent increase in funds for clinical
research. Figure 2 illustrates the previous effects. It represents the net increase of funds (in %) for
basic and clinical research respectively, with regard to the net increase of life-years lost in the districts
represented in HouS, separately for every Congress term, and the linear fit of the resulting set of
points. There are almost as many graphs showing a positive (4 graphs) and a negative (3 graphs)
slope for the linear fit of the relationship between life-years lost and funds for basic research, which
suggests that (at least the sign of) the correlation between basic research funds and life-years lost
is null. However, for any Congress term, except possibly for the term starting in 1997, the slope of
the linear fit of the plots representing the increase of funds for clinical research is greater than the
linear fit of the plots representing the increase of funds for clinical research with respect to increases
in life-years lost. In addition, these figures show that the estimations do not stem from the behavior
of some obvious disease outlier.
The previous specifications are more suited to the actual formulation of the budget described in
section 3. However, as a robustness check, I estimate the parameters of equation 13 in Table 5, with
robust standard errors clustered by disease, type of research and state.18 These estimations confirm
the effect of life-years lost in districts of HouS members on clinical research and the absence of effect
of this group on the funds for basic research. This effect is robust to the inclusion of variables NCs,t,
which control for the potential earmarking of research funds to the representatives’ states. (The es-
timated coefficients of NCgs,t are reported later for clarity.) In addition, at this level of aggregation,
life-years lost in HouA and HouM have a positive and significant impact on research funds for clinical
research for some specifications. By construction, if states are similar and congressmen do not directly
18As mentioned in the Section 4, I assume that the missing observations (less than 200 out of 9600) result from missing
information on the amount of funds for research on a given disease of a given type in a given state. A Tobit estimation
would give similar results.
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earmark NIH funds to some states, this level of aggregation leads to lower estimated standard errors
than when data are aggregated by disease and type of research only. States, however, are not similar,
and the skewness of the distribution of NIH funds across states could explain part of the new results.
To check this possibility, I estimate the coefficients of a variant of equations 12 and 13, replacing the
log of funds by the funds themselves, and the log of life-years lost by the average number of life-years
lost in the districts represented in the group of interest (`y in equation 4). Table 6 reports the results
of these estimations. They suggest that the composition of HouM does have a substantial impact on
the amount of funds by disease and by type of research and by state, whereas the estimated coefficients
for HouA are rather small — none of these coefficients is significant, though. The large estimated co-
efficients of “life-years lost in HouA” variables thus reflect changes of funding for research of a certain
type, on certain diseases and in certain states that represent a negligible part of the NIH budget.
These estimations also support the role of HouS on the funds allocation. Given that HouS contains
around 14 members, columns 4 or 6 in Table 6 show that an additional life-year lost due to a disease
in HouS leads to an increase of NIH funds by year for clinical research on that disease equal to around
102,000
2×14 ' $3600 by year.
Table 7 displays the results of the 2SLS estimation of equations 12 and 13, using the instrument
defined in equation 15. Life-years lost in HouS affect the allocation of NIH funds across diseases, as
long as life-years lost variables of HouM are not included in the controls. The correlation between
HouM and HouS districts’ characteristics, stemming from the fact that the share of majority members
in HouS is equal to the share of majority members in the whole House, limits the possibility of distin-
guishing the respective effects of life-years lost in HouS and HouM in a 2SLS estimation (note that,
even though these estimations are not shown here, controlling for life-years lost variables of any group
other than HouM does not affect the significance of the effect of life-years lost in HouS’ districts).
These results may thus either confirm that HouS members have a distinct bargaining power in the
congressional negotiations over the NIH budget, or suggest that members of the House majority also
have some bargaining power on the allocation process. I explore this latter hypothesis in Section 6.2.
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6.2 The role of the House majority
The estimated influence of HouS and HouM suggest that congressmen who belong to both group
may have a large bargaining power. To estimate this power, I split the HouS into two groups, con-
gressmen who belong to HouM, and those who do not. The estimations, reported in the first columns
of Table 8, show that members of the minority of HouS indeed have no impact on the allocations of
funds across diseases. In fact, since committees’ and subcommittees’ affiliations are decided within
parties, the influence of a district on the budget stems from the influence of its representatives in a
party and the bargaining power of its representative in Congress. Testing this hypothesis would re-
quire knowing the weight that every district, through its representatives in a party, has on that party’s
objectives. Since I do not observe these weights, I define an ad hoc “party’s life-years lost function”
for the Democratic and Republican parties that is the weighted sum of life-years lost in US districts,
where the weight of a district is the number of times that district’s House representative belonged to
that party. The share of life-years lost in the majority party is then, for the terms starting between
1985 and 1993,
LYd,t ≡
∑1993
y=1985
∑
c in g,
at y
life− yearscd∑
d∈D
∑1993
y=1985
∑
c in g,
at y
life− yearscd
(16)
and, for the terms starting between 1995 and 2001,
LYd,t ≡
∑2001
y=1995
∑
c in g,
at y
life− yearscd∑
d∈D
∑2001
t=1995
∑
c in g,
at y
life− yearscd
(17)
The majority party for any term starting between 1985 and 1993 (resp. between 1995 and 2001)
is thus the fictitious group of representatives active between 1985 and 1994 (resp. between 1995 and
2002), in which a representative appears n times if she was n times in HouM between those years.
This definition assumes that the more “loyal” districts have more influence in the party. Columns (3),
(5) and (7) of Table 8 report the estimation of the effect of the share of that life-years lost function
on the NIH funds. They show that life-years lost in the districts that have been more loyal to the
majority party of the House have a significant and positive effect on the allocation of funds for clinical
research across diseases. They do not have any impact on the allocation of funds for basic research,
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except in Column (4), which only suggests that HouM and the fictious “majority party” are very
similar. To summarize these last results and the previous ones, some districts have a larger weight in
the Congressional allocation process, this larger weight stems from their representatives’ membership
in the majority party, or from their House representatives possible membership in HouS, or both —
the interpretation of the estimation results depending on the validity of the identification assumptions.
To illustrate the consequences of the weight of the House majority party, I estimate the coun-
terfactual allocation of funds across diseases that would have occurred if the Republican party had
not won the majority between 1995 and 2002. The results of the counterfactual analysis are reported
in Table 9. They show a substantial increase in public funding for clinical research on psychiatric
disorders, central nervous system diseases and respiratory disorders due to the majority change, and
a substantial decrease of funding for clinical research on congenital, hypertensive and HIV-related
disorders.
6.3 Allocation of funds across states
Table 10 reports the estimations of the coefficients ρ of the equation 13 and some variants. The
number of representatives of a state in HouS shows no significant positive effect on the research funds
for that state, regardless of whether other groups’ variables are included in the regressions. (In fact,
it seems to have a negative impact on the funds by state; this result, however, is not robust to
the inclusion of additional controls). No group seems to have any significant positive effect on the
distribution of funds across states. These results do not imply that earmarking does not exist at all
— in fact some empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest the opposite (see Section 2) — but
they suggest that earmarking either affects the redistribution within states or involves relatively small
amounts of funds.
The lack of any significant effect is quite surprising nevertheless, especially for the specifications
that do not include the social cost variables (e.g. Column 1 of table 10), since one may conjecture
that the research interests of research institutions are correlated with the health conditions of their
neighboring population. To investigate further that conjecture, I compute the log of the share of
life-years lost LY sd,t ≡
life−yearssd∑
d life−yearssd separately for every state, and regress the log of funds on that
variable, as in:
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logFd,θ,s,t = ω logLY
s
d,t + ωClinic logLY
s
d,t × Clinicθ +Xd,θ,s,t + ud,θ,s,t (18)
where Xd,θ,s,t may include dummy variables for every Congress term, type of research, disease and
state, and the interactions between the type of research and other dummy variables. The results (see
Table 11) show no significant impact of life-years lost on research funds at the state level. Figure 3
represents the funds for research in a state with respect to life-years lost in that state for every disease,
aggregated over all Congress terms and over both types of research. It confirms the result of the last
estimations and shows that there is no systematic positive correlation between research interests and
local health conditions. In fact, there is no obvious positive correlation between research interests and
local health conditions for any disease other than HIV, infectious disorders and hypertension. Once
aggregated at the state level, committee membership thus has no significant effect on the geographic
allocation of NIH funds, either directly or indirectly through the allocation of funds by disease.
7 Discussion
The previous results raise at least two immediate questions: what causes a group’s bargaining
power, and why does the composition of the majority or HouS have more effect on clinical than basic
research?
What causes a group’s bargaining power? As in the seminal paper of Baron and Ferejohn
1989, being the proposer of the NIH budget to Congress can provide some additional bargaining power,
if congressmen are impatient. This mechanism may explain the power of HouS, although the Senate
committee SenL also makes recommendations on the NIH budget. In fact, on a different question,
Knight 2005 finds that it is the Transportation Authorization Committee, roughly the equivalent of
SenL for transportation issues, that has power on the distribution of funds for road projects. In
addition, the estimations show no effect of the composition of SenS, the equivalent of HouS in the
Senate. The question of the specific influence of HouS among all potential proposers thus remains
open. This study also leaves open the question of congressmen’s motivations. Are they interested
in their constituents’ health conditions for electoral purposes, or are they concerned with their own
health conditions or their relatives’, which happen to be aligned with their constituents?
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Differences between basic and clinical research. The results of this study do not indicate
precisely whose diseases enter a congressman’s utility. However, the fact that the composition of
the House subcommittee affects only the allocation of clinical research, with no significant impact
on basic research, suggests that congressmen are concerned with the productivity of research across
diseases. To support this claim, I examine three differences between basic and clinical research that
could explain this result, the third one being the most plausible cause of the estimation results.
First, clinical research on a disease may be more likely to be located in states or districts relatively
more affected by that disease. Congressmen would then use clinical research topics as an earmarking
device towards research institutes located in their districts or states. But the estimated coefficients
on the number of congressmen of a state in HouS or HouM, reported in column 2 of table 10, are not
significant, which suggests the rejection of that first hypothesis. Second, the returns from investment
in basic research (or the parameter pig in equation 7 of Section 5.1) may be very small for congressmen:
clinical research may be easier to publicize for electorally-motivated politicians, or clinical research
could lead to faster pharmaceutical innovations. Small returns on basic research would not prevent
congressmen from ranking research projects according to the social benefits they may bring (unless
the returns from basic research were null in which case the funds for basic research should be null as
well.) We should thus estimate βˆ > 0 in the estimations. However, this estimated coefficient is never
large or significant. Third, the productivity of clinical research may be more easily estimated by non-
specialists of medical research than basic research. This difference could stem from the complexity of
scientific knowledge as well as from the legal restrictions that bind the uncertainty of clinical research,
which, by definition, uses human data. If congressmen’ s information on basic research is poor enough,
Proposition 1 claims that they should delegate the allocation of these funds to the NIH staff, who shares
congressmen’s concern for research productivity, but have no reason to take into account the specific
health conditions of powerful congressmen’ s electorate.19 For that claim to hold, the shocks on the
productivity of research (such as the factors ck in Section 5.1) should necessarily have a larger variance
for basic than for clinical research. To investigate that point, I regress the squared residuals of the
last regression shown in Table 4 on the dummy variable for clinical research Clinicθ. The estimated
coefficient of Clinicθ, reported in Table 12, is negative, and significant when I include a dummy variable
for every disease and/or Congress term. Under the assumption that the residuals are indeed shocks on
19NIH officials are usually appointed for several years.
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research productivity, these regressions thus support the third hypothesis. Anecdotal evidence from
the description of the NIH organization also supports that hypothesis: the explicit mission of one
agency, the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, is to fund basic research on any disease.
The allocation of the budget of this agency across diseases is thus effectively delegated to its staff.20 As
argued by Foucault 1963, political authority influences the focus of medical research, at least through
the funding of this research. However, the concern for scientific productivity limits the effect of this
authority on basic research.
8 Summary and Extensions
This paper finds that the social cost of a disease, measured in life-years lost, on the constituents
represented either in the majority party of the House or in the subcommittee of the House Appropria-
tions Committee in charge of health issues has a positive impact on the NIH funds for clinical research
on that disease awarded through R01 grants. In addition, there is no significant effect of the state
origin of the members of these groups on the allocation of funds across states.
These results show that congressional elections are a source of exogenous changes of NIH funding
priorities. This source could be used to understand better the complementarity between public and
private research (David, Hall and Toole 2000, Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen 2010, Toole 2007), and their
joint effect on medical innovations. These results also contribute to the existing literature on Congress
by raising another channel of committee power than the usual pork-barrel. The issue at stake here is
not the pure distribution of private goods among congressmen, already considered in the legislative
bargaining literature. It is not an ideological issue either, and, as such, requires another approach.
Given that a large part of the public budget is distributed through agencies, the economic effect of
these institutions demands closer theoretical and empirical investigation.
20Congressional bills may yet give some directions for the use of that budget. Moreover, a substantial number of basic
grants are awarded by other agencies or smaller subdivisions of the NIH.
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Figure 1: Log of life-years lost in the House majority districts 1985-2002.
Notes: See text for the construction of the data.
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Figure 2: Increase in life-years lost in HouS and increase in funds for research from one Congress term
to the next. Actual and linear fit by type of research and by Congress term, for the period 1985-2002.
Notes: See the text for the construction of the data. The x-axis represents the difference between the
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Figure 3: Share of life years lost and NIH funds awarded during the period 1985-2002, by state and
by disease.
Notes: See the text for the construction of the data. The x-axis represents the log of the share of
life-years lost in any state in 1991.
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Table 1: Congress Groups
House Senate Name/Composition In charge of:
HouM SenM
Congressmen who belong to the
Majority party of the chamber.
HouA SenA Appropriations committee the budget proposal
HouS SenS
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human the NIH budget proposal
Services, Education and Related Agencies (among other charges)
of the Appropriations committees
HouSM Representatives who belong
both to HouS and to HouM
HouSm Representatives who belong
to HouS, but not to HouM
SenL
Committee on Health, Education, providing recommendations
Labor and Pensions for the NIH budget
Note: The exact name of committees and subcommittees slightly changes from year to year. Section
6.2 describes the construction of the “majority party”, a fictitious group that is not included in this
table.
Table 2: Number of Members per Year and Congress Group
Year HouM HouS HouA SenM SenL SenS SenA
1985 253 13 57 53 16 15 29
1987 258 13 57 55 16 15 29
1989 260 13 57 55 15 15 29
1991 269 12 59 56 17 15 29
1993 259 13 60 55 17 15 29
1995 236 13 56 61 16 15 28
1997 228 14 60 55 17 15 28
1999 223 15 61 55 18 15 28
2001 223 17 65 49 21 15 29
Note: See Table 1.
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Table 3: Summary statistics by disease
Diseases #Deaths #Life-years Log Share of LY lost Log Funds
(/1000) lost(/1000)
US US US HouM HouS Basic Clinical
CNS 89.4 2,666 1.57 1.57 1.55 20.4 20.6
.0205 .0262 .416 .407
Cardiovascular 859 20,158 3.59 3.59 3.6 19.8 19.9
.0119 .0117 .43 .371
Congenital 34.1 3,185 1.75 1.74 1.7 19.4 19.6
.0673 .0236 .285 .208
Digestive 197 5,881 2.36 2.36 2.38 19.2 19.4
.00325 .017 .33 .41
Endocrine 66 1,914 1.24 1.24 1.22 20.1 20.2
.0116 .0322 .249 .237
HIV 79.6 3,434 1.82 1.8 1.8 20.8 21.2
.0508 .0436 .255 .296
Hypertension 32.8 830 .403 .394 .448 18.4 18.8
.08 .0506 .219 .261
Infectious 121 2,992 1.68 1.68 1.68 20.1 19.7
.0202 .0154 .517 .398
Psychiatric 47.1 2,195 1.37 1.38 1.29 19 20.6
.0322 .0206 .336 .488
Reproductive 103 3,100 1.72 1.72 1.74 19.1 20
.00462 .0319 .581 .525
Respiratory 276 8,055 2.67 2.68 2.69 18.6 18.8
.0212 .0091 .407 .437
Urinary 42.2 1,107 .69 .689 .733 18.6 18.6
.00459 .022 .315 .231
Notes: columns 1 to 3 report the total number of deaths, life-years lost, and the log of the share of life-years lost (see equation 3) in
the US in 1991. Columns 4 and 5 report the mean (upper row) and standard deviation (lower row) of the log of the share of life-years
lost in the districts represented in HouM and HouS across Congress terms for the period 1985-2002, by disease. Table 1 contains
information on congressional groups. The funds are the NIH funds awarded to R01 grants in the period 1985-2002. CNS stands
for Central Nervous System diseases, and include connective tissue diseases, musculoskeletal and dermatological disorders. The
category Congenital disorders includes all death records that are explicitly due to a congenital disease (to compute LY ) and any
research project (to compute Log Funds) that mentions congenital. The category HIV includes all sexually-transmitted disorders,
HIV-related pathologies, as well as blood/lymphatic neoplasms (to be consistent with the early NIH classification of HIV). The
category Infectious diseases includes all infectious disorders except sexually-transmitted disorders. The category Cardiovascular
diseases includes all cardiovascular disorders that are not explicitly linked to another disorder.
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Table 5: Increase in life-years lost and NIH funds, by disease, type of research and state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is funds by disease, by type of research and by state
Life-years lost in HouS 0.46 -0.95 -0.25 -0.25
(0.43) (0.66) (0.63) (0.63)
Life-years lost in HouS ×Clinicθ 2.83* 1.85* 1.85*
(0.86) (0.84) (0.84)
Life-years lost in HouA -5.06* -5.05* -3.74* -5.05*
(1.77) (1.77) (1.49) (1.78)
Life-years lost in HouA ×Clinicθ 1.98 1.97 5.04* 3.00
(2.31) (2.31) (1.92) (2.30)
Life-years lost in HouM 0.93 0.93 -0.36 0.91
(0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.81)
Life-years lost in HouM ×Clinicθ 1.40 1.40 2.48* 1.97+
(1.07) (1.07) (1.00) (1.12)
Life-years lost in SenS -0.64 -0.64
(0.42) (0.43)
Life-years lost in SenS ×Clinicθ 0.12 0.12
(0.57) (0.57)
Life-years lost in SenA 1.18 1.18 0.63
(0.81) (0.81) (0.68)
Life-years lost in SenA ×Clinicθ 0.36 0.36 0.79
(1.13) (1.14) (0.92)
Life-years lost in SenM -2.27* -2.27* -1.75*
(0.86) (0.86) (0.80)
Life-years lost in SenM ×Clinicθ -0.69 -0.68 -0.83
(1.24) (1.24) (1.13)
Life-years lost in SenL -0.44 -0.44
(0.39) (0.39)
Life-years lost in SenL ×Clinicθ -0.90+ -0.90+
(0.52) (0.52)
# State congressmen variables No No No Yes No No No
Observations 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475
R2 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.020
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 13 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent variable
funds by disease, type of research and state is the difference between the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on disease d
awarded through R01 grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t− 1 (logFd,θ,s,t − logFd,θ,s,t−1). Life-years
lost in ... is the difference between the log of the share of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in the districts/states represented
in ... in Congress terms t and t− 1 (logLYd,t − logLYd,t−1). Column (4) includes controls for the number of congressmen of state
s represented in any group (NCs,t −NCs,t−1). See Table 1 for information on the groups, Section 4 for information on the data.
Clinic equals 1 if the type of research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of
research and their interactions. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 6: Increase in life-years lost and NIH funds - in levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is funds by disease and by type of research
and by state
Life-years lost in HouS -31,859 -640* -591* -1,213*
(34,178) (299) (274) (272)
Life-years lost in HouS ×Clinicθ 102,280* 2,050* 1,827* 2,607*
(40,188) (513) (478) (531)
Life-years lost in HouA 589
(650)
Life-years lost in HouA ×Clinicθ -101
(1,149)
Life-years lost in HouM -393 -172
(449) (470)
Life-years lost in HouM ×Clinicθ 1,786* 1,288
(722) (751)
Life-years lost in SenS 6.29
(9.87)
Life-years lost in SenS ×Clinicθ -17.7
(21.0)
Life-years lost in SenA 23.9*
(7.84)
Life-years lost in SenA ×Clinicθ -30.5*
(13.9)
Life-years lost in SenM -25.2*
(8.99)
Life-years lost in SenM ×Clinicθ 28.0
(14.3)
Life-years lost in SenL 6.88
(4.27)
Life-years lost in SenL ×Clinicθ -4.69
(8.91)
Observations 192 9,534 9,534 9,534
R2 0.243 0.026 0.027 0.029
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 12 in Column 1 (resp. equation 13 in Columns 2 to
4) for the period 1985-2002 with the following modifications. The dependent variable funds by disease, type of research (resp. funds
by disease, type of research, and state) is the difference between the NIH funds awarded for research of type θ, on disease d (resp.
of type θ, on disease d, to research institutes in state s) in Congress terms t and t−1 (Fd,θ,t−Fd,θ,t−1 (resp. Fd,θ,s,t−Fd,θ,s,t−1)).
Life-years lost in ... is the difference between the average number of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in the districts/states
represented in ... in Congress terms t and t− 1 (`yd,t − `yd,t−1, see equation 4). See Table 1 for information on the groups. Clinic
equals 1 if the type of research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of research
and their interactions. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 7: Increase in life-years lost on NIH funds - 2SLS
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Life-years lost funds by disease funds by disease,
in HouS and type of research type of research,
and state
Life-years lost in HouS -1.66 -1.34 0.19 0.97
(1.07) (1.11) (1.51) (1.53)
Life-years lost in HouS ×Clinicθ 3.12* 1.19 2.59 -0.27
(1.30) (1.73) (1.92) (1.90)
Life-years lost in HouM -0.29 -0.70
(1.06) (0.69)
Life-years lost in HouM ×Clinicθ 1.73 2.57*
(1.37) (0.92)
Life-years lost in HouS∗ 3.17*
(0.32)
Observations 192 192 192 9,475 9,475
R2 0.323 0.209 0.200 0.018 0.018
Notes: this table reports the 2SLS estimation of the parameters of equation 12 in Columns 2-3 (resp. equation 13 in Columns 4-5) for
the period 1985-2002, using Life-years lost in HouS∗ as an instrument for Life-years lost in HouS (see equation 15). The dependent
variable funds by disease, type of research (resp. and state) is the difference between the NIH funds for research of type θ, on
disease d, awarded through R01 grants (resp. to research institutes in state s), in Congress terms t and t−1 (logFd,θ,t− logFd,θ,t−1
(resp. logFd,θ,s,t − logFd,θ,s,t−1)). Life-years lost in ... is the difference between the log of the share of life-years lost to 100
due to disease d in the districts/states represented in ... in Congress terms t and t − 1 (LYd,t − LYd,t−1). Column 1 reports the
estimation of the first stage. Table 1 provides information on congressional groups. Clinicθ is a variable equal to 1 if θ = clinical,
0 otherwise. The regressions include dummies for Congress terms and, when relevant, type of research and their interactions. *
p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 8: Role of House majority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is funds by disease, by type of research
and by state
Life-years lost in HouSM -0.84* -1.19* -1.18*
(0.38) (0.29) (0.44)
Life-years lost in HouSM ×Clinicθ 1.85* 1.43* 1.42*
(0.48) (0.54) (0.62)
Life-years lost in HouSm -0.027 0.22 0.32
(0.46) (0.58) (0.52)
Life-years lost in HouSm ×Clinicθ 0.54 0.84 0.93
(0.56) (0.70) (0.67)
Life-years lost in HouM 1.14 5.17 1.66
(1.59) (3.86) (1.36)
Life-years lost in HouM ×Clinicθ 1.41 -2.85 1.87
(1.89) (5.11) (1.83)
Life-years lost in majority party -1.08 -6.29+ -0.37 -0.67
(0.96) (3.21) (0.98) (0.71)
Life-years lost in maj. party ×Clinicθ 2.43* 5.31 2.48+ 2.52*
(1.08) (4.45) (1.30) (0.95)
Life-years lost in HouA -2.40
(2.00)
Life-years lost in HouA ×Clinicθ 2.18
(2.34)
Life-years lost in SenA 0.35
(0.60)
Life-years lost in SenA ×Clinicθ -0.092
(0.84)
Life-years lost in SenM -0.96
(1.17)
Life-years lost in SenM ×Clinicθ -0.68
(1.53)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 9,475 9,475
R2 0.218 0.234 0.197 0.208 0.221 0.020 0.018
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 12 in columns 1-5 (resp. equation 13 in columns
6-7) for the period 1985-2002. The dependent variable funds by disease and by type of research (resp. by disease, by type of
research and by state) is the difference between the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on disease d awarded (resp. of type θ
on disease d awarded to research institutes in state s) through R01 grants in Congress terms t and t − 1 (logFd,θ,t − logFd,θ,t−1
[resp. logFd,θ,s,t − logFd,θ,s,t−1]). Life-years lost in ... is the difference between the log of the share of life-years lost to 100
due to disease d in the districts/states represented in ... in Congress terms t and t − 1 (logLYd,t − logLYd,t−1). See Table 1 for
information on the groups, Section 6.2 describes the construction of the fictitious “majority party”. Clinic equals 1 if the type of
research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of research and their interactions.
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 9: Estimation of the effect of 1995 majority shift
All Clinical
Disease Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
CNS 9.71e+09 9.63e+09 5.25e+09 4.99e+09
Cardiovascular 5.13e+09 5.11e+09 2.69e+09 2.60e+09
Congenital 3.07e+09 3.20e+09 1.63e+09 1.96e+09
Digestive 2.63e+09 2.63e+09 1.49e+09 1.50e+09
Endocrine 5.51e+09 5.52e+09 2.75e+09 2.82e+09
HIV 1.42e+10 1.49e+10 8.76e+09 9.99e+09
Hypertension 1.21e+09 1.30e+09 7.32e+08 8.99e+08
Infectious 5.69e+09 5.66e+09 2.17e+09 2.29e+09
Psychiatric 6.38e+09 6.04e+09 5.45e+09 5.06e+09
Reproductive 4.48e+09 4.45e+09 3.08e+09 3.04e+09
Respiratory 1.57e+09 1.56e+09 8.99e+08 8.52e+08
Urinary 1.27e+09 1.27e+09 5.96e+08 6.01e+08
Notes: the table presents the estimation of the actual and counterfactual total amount of funds that
would have been awarded through competing R01 grants between 1995 and 2002 for any type of research
(All), and for clinical research only (Clinical), if the House majority had not changed in 1995. The
counterfactual estimations rely on the specification of column (3) in Table 8.
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Table 10: Effect of state affiliation of congressmen on NIH funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is funds by disease, by type of research and by state
# State congressmen in HouS -0.048* -0.030 -0.031 0.0064 0.0064
(0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
# State congressmen in HouS ×Clinicθ -0.036 -0.033 -0.047 -0.047
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.054)
# State congressmen in HouA -0.058+ -0.058+
(0.031) (0.031)
# State congressmen in HouA ×Clinicθ 0.015 0.015
(0.040) (0.040)
# State congressmen in HouM 0.0064 0.0081 0.0081
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0096)
# State congressmen in HouM ×Clinicθ -0.013 -0.016 -0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
# State congressmen in SenS 0.098 0.097
(0.064) (0.063)
# State congressmen in SenS ×Clinicθ 0.042 0.043
(0.088) (0.088)
# State congressmen in SenA -0.094+ -0.094+
(0.049) (0.049)
# State congressmen in SenA ×Clinicθ 0.018 0.018
(0.065) (0.065)
# State congressmen in SenM -0.026 -0.026
(0.021) (0.021)
# State congressmen in SenM ×Clinicθ 0.047 0.048
(0.030) (0.030)
# State congressmen in SenL 0.030 0.030
(0.044) (0.045)
# State congressmen in SenL ×Clinicθ 0.044 0.044
(0.058) (0.058)
Life-years lost variables No No No No Yes
Observations 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475
R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.025
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 13 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent variable
funds by disease, type of research and state is the difference between the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on disease d awarded
through R01 grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t−1 (logFd,θ,s,t− logFd,θ,s,t−1). # State congressmen
in ... is the difference between the number of congressmen from state s in ... in Congress terms t and t− 1 (NCs,t −NCs,t−1).
Column (5) includes controls for the life-years lost in any group (logLYd,t− logLYs,t−1). See Table 1 for information on the groups,
Section 4 for information on the data. Clinic equals 1 if the type of research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions include dummies
for Congress terms and type of research and their interactions. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, +
p<0.1.
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Table 11: Effect of local life-years lost on research focus
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable is funds by disease, type of research and state
Life-years lost in state s 0.087 0.084 0.14
(0.088) (0.073) (0.12)
Life-years lost in state s × Clinicθ -0.12
(0.14)
Interaction Congress term-Clinicθ No Yes Yes
Interaction Disease-Clinicθ No Yes Yes
Observations 10,729 10,729 10,729
R2 0.849 0.863 0.863
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of equation 18 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent
variable funds by disease, type of research and state is the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on
disease d awarded through R01 grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t − 1
(logFd,θ,s,t). Life-years lost in state s is the log of the share of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in
the districts/states represented in state s in Congress terms t (logLY sd,t). Clinic equals 1 if the type of
research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions include dummies for Congress terms, diseases, types of
research and states. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 12: Variance of funds for basic and clinical research
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is the square of the predicted residual 2d,θ,t
of the estimation reported in Column (9) of Table 4
Clinicθ -0.014 -0.014 -0.014* -0.014* -0.014*
(0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0064)
Congress term t dummy No Yes No Yes Yes
Disease d dummy No No Yes yes Yes
Interaction Disease-Congress Term No No No No Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.014 0.071 0.120 0.177 0.711
Notes: this table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the type of research (basic or clinical) on the
squared predicted residual of the estimation presented in Column (9) in Table 4. Clinicθ is a variable
equal to 1 if θ = clinical, 0 otherwise. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the solution
(
L∗,F∗L∗
)
defined in the proposition. If 2 ∈ L∗, then taking (L˜∗,F∗
L˜∗
)
=(
L∗,F∗L∗
)
proves the claim. If 2 /∈ L∗, let the function V : [0, 1]→ R be defined as:
V (δ) =
∫ +∞
0
. . .
∫ +∞
0
(
(1− δ)cαAC1 F ∗ γ1 + cαδAC1 Fˆ γα
)
g1(cα)dcαg2(c2)dc2g3(c3)dc3 . . . gn(cn)dcn +∫ +∞
0
. . .
∫ +∞
0
(
δcαA
C
2 F
∗ γ
1 + (1− δ)cαAC2 Fˆ γα
)
g1(c1)dc1g2(cα)dcαg3(c3)dc3 . . . gn(cn)dcn +∑
k∈L∗\{1}
∫ +∞
0
ckF
∗ γ
k A
C
k gk(ck)dck +
∑
k∈K\L∗∪{2}
∫ +∞
0
. . .
∫ +∞
0
ckFˆ
γ
kA
C
k g1(c1)dc1g2(c2)dc2 . . . gn(cn)dcn
where Fˆα, FˆK\(L∗∪{2}) solves:
 Max{Fα∈R+,Fk∈R+,k∈K\(L∗∪{2})}cαF
γ
αAN1 +
∑
k∈K\(L∗∪{2}) ckF
γ
kA
N
k
s.t. Fα +
∑
K\(L∗∪{2}) Fk = F
∗ −∑k∈L∗ F ∗k (19)
V (0) is C’s utility achieved at the solution
(
F ∗, L∗,F∗L∗
)
, and V (1) is the utility that would be achieved
if 1 and 2 were swapped, every other variable chosen by C remaining unchanged (note that the expected
allocation of funds across the research categories of K \ (L∗ ∪ {2}) by N is then the same before and
after the swap). The first-order conditions of N ’s problem impose, for any k ∈ {α} ∪K \ (L∗ ∪ {2}):
Fˆk =
(ckAk)
1
1−γ∑
k∈{c}∪K\(L∗∪{2})(ckAk)
1
1−γ
(
F ∗ −
∑
k∈L∗
F ∗k
)
so that:
V ′(δ) = AC1
∫ +∞
0
. . .
∫ +∞
0
cαFˆ
γ
c [g1(cα)− g2(cα)]dcαΠk∈K\(L∗∪{2})gk(ck)dck
is nonnegative since the function cα 7→ cαFˆ γα is convex and g2 second-order dominates g1. V is
nondecreasing in δ, V (0) ≤ V (1), so that the solution defined by the swap of 1 and 2 is indeed an
optimum of C’s maximization problem, in which 2 is not delegated.
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Table 13: NIH Funds awarded through R01 grants- Total and sample
Year Total funds Sample funds Sample - Basic Sample - Clinical
1985 1.02e+10 7.43e+09 3.30e+09 4.13e+09
1987 1.06e+10 8.37e+09 3.68e+09 4.69e+09
1989 9.89e+09 8.37e+09 3.41e+09 4.96e+09
1991 9.89e+09 8.52e+09 3.34e+09 5.18e+09
1993 1.14e+10 9.71e+09 3.95e+09 5.76e+09
1995 1.29e+10 1.10e+10 4.41e+09 6.59e+09
1997 1.68e+10 1.41e+10 5.87e+09 8.28e+09
1999 2.03e+10 1.72e+10 7.23e+09 9.94e+09
2001 2.19e+10 1.85e+10 7.82e+09 1.07e+10
Notes: total of NIH funds awarded through competing R01 grants, and sample of funds that I can match to a disease and a type
of research, by Congress term, for the period 1985-2002.
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Table 14: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Funds Fd,s,θ,t 9619018.177 21966644.853 77 402696000
Log Fd,s,θ,t 14.411 2.253 4.353 19.814
# State congressmen in HouS 0.275 0.516 0 2
# State congressmen in HouA 1.19 1.354 0 7
# State congressmen in HouM 4.935 5.139 0 30
# State congressmen in SenS 0.299 0.482 0 2
# State congressmen in SenA 0.573 0.55 0 2
# State congressmen in SenM 1.089 0.771 0 2
# State congressmen in SenL 0.34 0.497 0 2
# State congressmen in majority and HouS 0.17 0.41 0 2
# State congressmen in minority and HouS 0.105 0.314 0 2
# State congressmen in majority party 5.116 5.582 0 31.909
LYd,t in subcommittee HouS ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.220 1.478 37.202
LYd,t in committee HouA ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.197 1.433 36.734
LYd,t in House majority ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.152 1.356 36.953
LYd,t in subcommittee SenS ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.355 1.374 37.648
LYd,t in committee SenA ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.130 1.472 37.064
LYd,t in Senate majority ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.19 1.404 37.071
LYd,t in committee SenL ( ×100 ) 8.343 9.332 1.294 37.112
LYd,t in House majority and HouS 8.343 9.309 1.377 38.274
LYd,t in House minority and HouS 8.343 9.124 1.246 37.335
LYd,t in House majority party 8.343 9.128 1.365 36.828
Life-years lost in HouS -2.869 0.815 -4.215 -0.989
Life-years lost in HouA -2.869 0.820 -4.245 -1.001
Life-years lost in HouM -2.867 0.819 -4.3 -0.996
Life-years lost in SenS -2.879 0.830 -4.287 -0.977
Life-years lost in SenA -2.864 0.816 -4.218 -0.993
Life-years lost in SenM -2.868 0.818 -4.266 -0.992
Life-years lost in SenL -2.876 0.825 -4.347 -0.991
Life-years lost in majority and HouS -2.875 0.821 -4.286 -0.96
Life-years lost in minority and HouS -2.864 0.814 -4.385 -0.985
Life-years lost in majority party -2.865 0.818 -4.294 -0.999
Notes: Fd,θ,s,t denotes funds for research on disease d of type θ, awarded to research institutes in state s in Congress term t. LYd,t
in group G: share of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in the districts/states represented in the group G at t as defined in
equation 3. Table 1 contains information on congressional groups. “Majority party” is a constructed group defined in Section 6.2
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